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Abstract 
The 2010 European debt crisis has revived the discussion concerning the optimum adjustment 
strategy in the face of asymmetric shocks. Whereas Mundell’s (1961) seminal theory on optimum 
currency  areas  suggests  depreciation  in  the  face  of  crisis,  the  most  recent  emergence  of 
competitive depreciations, competitive interest rate cuts or currency wars questions the exchange 
rate  as  an  adjustment  tool  to  asymmetric  economic  development.  This  paper  approaches  the 
question from a theoretical perspective by confronting exchange rate based adjustment with crisis 
adjustment via price and wage cuts. Econometric estimations yield a negative impact of exchange 
rate flexibility/volatility on growth, which is found to be particularly strong for countries with 
asymmetric business cycles and during recessions. Based on these findings we support a further 
enlargement of the European Monetary Union and recommend more exchange rate stability for 
the rest of the world.  
 
 
JEL codes: F31, F32 
 
Keywords: Exchange rate regime, crisis, shock adjustment, theory of optimum currency areas, 
Mundell, Schumpeter, Hayek, competitive depreciations, currency war. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The recent wave of financial and economic crisis – which for the time being culminated in the 
European debt crisis and “a global currency war” – have revived the discussion about of the 
adequate adjustment strategy (Sinn 2010, Schnabl and Zemanek 2011). Given the Greek and 
Irish struggle to regain competitiveness via (nominal) wage cuts, there is a strong argument to 
maintain the exchange rate as adjustment tool to idiosyncratic shocks. For instance, after the 
Asian crisis, the crisis countries could engineer a timely recovery based on strong depreciations 
of  their  currencies.  Similarly,  in  the  year  2002  Argentina  stabilised  its  ailing  economy  by 
abandoning a highly criticized currency board. During the most recent wave of crisis, the Central 
and Eastern European countries adopted different adjustment strategies. Whereas Romania and 
the  Czech  Republic  responded  with  interest  rate  cuts  and  currency  depreciation,  the  Baltic 
countries  tolerated  credit  tightening  and  took  decisive  measures  to  curtail  wages  to  restore 
international competiveness. 
 
The different adjustment strategies in the face of crisis based on inflation or deflation are based 
on different theoretical frameworks, which were widely discussed during the world economic 
crisis,  either  Hawtrey  (1919)  and  Keynes  (1936)  or  Schumpeter  (1911)  and  Hayek  (1931). 
Hawtrey (1919), who dedicated his academic work the deflationary consequences of the return to 
the gold standard, recommended monetary expansion to prevent dire deflation. After monetary 
policy  had  proved  unable  to  revive  world  economic  activity,  Keynes  (1936)  proposed  fiscal 
stimulus as a substitute for the lack of private demand. In the spirit of Hawtrey (1919) and with 
reference to the 1929 world economic crisis, currently monetary policy is widely regarded as a 
tool to forestall deflation (Greenspan 2007, Bernanke 2010). Mundell (1961) extended Hawtrey 
(1919) to a two-country setting and linked it to the question about the appropriate exchange rate 
regime. He made the seminal argument that the success of exchange rate stabilization strongly 
hinges on the degree of business cycle synchronization.  
 
In contrast to Hawtrey (1919), Hayek (1931) saw the monetary expansion during crisis as the 
reason for a more pronounced downturn at some later point of time. In contrast to Keynes (1936), 
in Schumpeter’s (1911) theory the recession is an integral part of economic development with its 
“cleansing effect” being a necessary prerequisite for a sustained economic recovery. Mundell 
(1961)  implicitly  incorporated  Schumpeter  (1911)  by  arguing  that  missing  business  cycle 
synchronization could be compensated by sufficient labour market flexibility. Because higher 
growth can be seen either as the outcome of successful business cycle smoothing (Keynes 1936) 
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or a cleansing effect à la Schumpeter (1911) the question about the long-term growth effects of 
crisis therapies remains an empirical issue. This issue has recently been put forward by Parente 
and Prescott (2005), who consider growth a non linear process where recoveries after crisis and 
regime  switches  are  crucial  for  the  overall  growth  performance  and  depend  upon  national 
institutions and policies. 
 
Yet previous empirical evidence on the impact of exchange rate regime on growth remains mixed 
as well. From a historical perspective, Eichengreen (2002) argues that the United Kingdom could 
manage  a  faster  recovery  after  the  world  economic  crisis,  because  the  gold  standard  was 
abandoned earlier. Cerra, Panizza and Saxena (2009) find for a global sample of recent crisis 
events  that  monetary  expansion  and  depreciation  spur  the  rebound  after  crisis.  In  contrast, 
Schnabl (2009) finds a positive impact of exchange rate stability on growth in Emerging Europe 
and East Asia. Aghion et al. (2009) argue that the negative effect of exchange rate volatility on 
productivity growth vanishes above a critical threshold of financial development. In the same 
vein, and following Cerra and Saxena (2008), Coricelli and Maurel (2010) highlight that the 
recovery process to pre-crisis levels depends upon financial institutions and financial reforms. 
 
We aim to augment the existing literature in three ways. First, we discuss shock adjustment 
during crisis with respect to the implications for the exchange rate regime from both a short-term 
and long-term perspective based on Hawtrey (1919), Keynes (1936), Schumpeter (1911), Hayek 
(1931), and Mundell (1961). Second, we perform an econometric investigation for four emerging 
market country groups and the EU15 with respect to the role of exchange rate stability and price 
flexibility for growth in the context of business cycle correlation. Third, we aim to isolate the role 
of the exchange rate regime for growth in recessions.  
 
 
2. Exchange Rate Flexibility and Shock Adjustment à la Keynes  
 
“It is patently obvious that periodic balance of payments crisis will remain an integral feature of 
the international economic system as long as fixed exchange rates and rigid wage and price 
levels  prevent  the  terms  of  trade  from  fulfilling  a  natural  role  in  the  adjustment  process.”  
(Mundell: 1961: 657) 
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Given the growing number and dimension of country-specific and regional shocks, which the 
world has experienced during the last decades, monetary policy independence as advocated by 
Mundell (1961) seems more than ever necessary to re-equilibrate sudden changes in international 
competitiveness  (Fischer  2001).  At  the  same  time,  monetary  integration  has  proved  to  be  a 
shelter against global financial turmoil and imported inflation. The most recent series of crises 
following the US subprime crisis has highlighted both aspects for the European Monetary Union. 
In the face of the 2008/09 subprime shock, the common currency insulated the euro area against 
financial panic and dollar depreciation. During the 2010 Greek and Irish tragedy, the inability to 
realign competitiveness within a heterogeneous currency union threatened to topple the most 
ambitious realm of the European integration process.  
 
The  fundamental  assumption  of  Mundell’s  (1961)  seminal  theoretical  framework  is  –  in  the 
tradition of Hawtrey (1919) and Keynes (1936) – that monetary policy fulfils the task of business 
cycle stabilization. The argument that the “fault lies not with the type of currency area, but with 
the domain of the currency area” (Mundell 1961: 659) laid the fundament for the notion that 
optimum currency areas are characterized by synchronized business cycles. As long as countries 
were subject to the same country specific shock, interest rate changes by a common central bank 
were regarded as optimal policy solution. For instance the European Central Bank could stabilize 
the economic activity in the whole euro area during the subprime crisis, because the shock was 
symmetric. With the central bank fulfilling the task of macroeconomic stabilization, the EMU 
members could fully reap the microeconomic benefits of fixed exchange rates in form of low 
transaction costs for international trade and capital flows. 
 
Pressure arises in the case of asymmetric shocks as during the Greek and Irish crisis. Given a 
one-size-monetary  policy  (and  symmetric  country  size),  the  burden  of  adjustment  has  to  be 
shared by some more unemployment in the recession region and some inflation in the booming 
region (Mundell 1961: 660). Given this suboptimal policy outcome, monetary independence of 
the crisis country seems the optimum device to cope with rising unemployment. From a pure 
goods market view monetary expansion and the depreciation of the national currency adjust the 
terms of trade to “jumpstart” the crisis economy via the trade channel. For emerging markets the 
exchange rate is a particularly effective macroeconomic stabilization tool, as exports constitute a 
large share of national income and growth dynamics. For the enterprise sector adjustment is 
facilitated as domestic prices and nominal wages remain in the short-term constant, while prices 
in foreign currency decline.  
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The downside of Mundell’s (1961) approach to crisis therapy lies in the long-term consequences 
and in financial market repercussions. Monetary expansion and currency depreciation will be 
gradually  followed  by  rising  domestic  and  import  prices,  which  –  step  by  step  –  erode  the 
previous gains from monetary expansion. This can make a new monetary stimulus to be regarded 
as necessary. Depreciation in the face of crisis and recession can therefore end into a vicious 
circle of rising import prices, inflationary pressure and rising nominal and real interest rates, 
which puts a downward bias on the long-term growth performance (De Grauwe and Schnabl 
2008).  
 
Furthermore, Mundell’s (1961) thinking on policy response to macroeconomic instability is a 
pure goods market approach, which fitted well into the world of small capital markets and tight 
international  capital  controls  of  the  1950s  and  1960s.  In  contrast  today,  international  capital 
markets have grown substantially. The liberalization of international capital flows has facilitated 
inter-temporal optimization across borders (Schnabl and Zemanek 2011). Substantial stocks of 
international assets and liabilities have emerged. In this environment exchange rate stabilization 
has  become  a  matter  of  financial  stability  in  emerging  markets  economies,  because  capital 
markets are underdeveloped (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999). 
 
With  international  credit  being  mostly  provided  in  foreign  currency,  emerging  markets  are 
vulnerable  to  exchange  rate  fluctuations.  Countries  with  a  large  stock  of  foreign  currency 
denominated  debt  (such  as  most  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries)  are  vulnerable  to 
depreciations of the domestic currency (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004a). Countries with a large 
stock of foreign assets (such as China) exhibit a fear of floating on the appreciation side, as 
appreciations  devalue  foreign  assets  in  terms  of  domestic  currency  (McKinnon  and  Schnabl 
2004b). Given this currency mismatch in international lending sharp exchange rate fluctuations 
destabilize  financial  systems  and  trigger  recessions.  In  the  European  Monetary  Union  rising 
intra-region  liabilities  have  destabilized  the  currency  union  due  to  their  impact  on  the 
sustainability of national government debt. 
 
 
3. Exchange Rate Stability and Shock Adjustment à la Schumpeter 
 
The upshot is, that in a world of integrated capital markets keeping the exchange rate pegged 
during crisis seems the favourable policy choice. As shown by Coricelli and Maurel (2010), 
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while the globalisation of financial markets jeopardizes the capacity of emerging countries to 
rebound  after  a  crisis,  countries  characterized  by  better  financial  institutions  recover  faster. 
Mundell’s  (1961)  early  work  on  optimum  currency  areas  acknowledged  that  even  a 
heterogeneous  currency  area  would  work  if  factor  mobility  is  high  enough  to  equilibrate 
asymmetric economic developments. For Europe, which embarked on the monetary integration 
process, Mundell (1961: 661) recommended more labour market mobility.  
 
Acknowledging Ricardos assumption that labour market mobility within countries is high, but 
low across borders, wage flexibility is the main adjustment tool for asymmetric shocks when 
exchange rates are stable. To equilibrate international competitiveness, wages and prices in the 
crisis country have to fall relative to the boom country to re-animate growth under the condition 
of exchange rate stability. This is currently observed inter alia in the Baltics, Greece and Ireland, 
which were forced to drastic adjustments in the context of the crisis. But in normal times wage 
flexibility and labour mobility are considered to be low in Europe (Decressin and Fatas (1995), 
Bentivogli and Pagano (1999), Fidrmuc (2004)) as compared to the US counterpart (Blanchard 
and Katz 1992). 
 
Wage cuts during recession have two dimensions. First, during crisis reducing current account 
deficits requires lowering labour costs by cutting wages (or laying off workers). The austerity 
imposed  on  the  private  sector  reduces  its  real  income  what  aggravates  the  crisis.  Lower 
consumption  leads  to  lower  imports.  With  wage  costs  declining,  the  competitiveness  of  the 
export sector is improved and exports grow. The impact of wage cuts on the business cycle 
follows  a  “J-curve”,  it  is  negative  in  the  short  run  (because  of  shrinking  investment  and 
consumption) and positive in the longer run (because net exports increase). The  economy is 
rebalanced on the back of rising net exports. Internal adjustment is costly in the short run, but 
brings benefits in the long run. The implied trade-off is for instance behind the choice made by 
many Central and Eastern European countries to adhere to the Stability Growth Pact even if they 
were not formally obliged to enforce it, while coping with asymmetric shocks through internal 
adjustments (Babetski et al. 2004).  
 
Furthermore, Mundell (1961) did not incorporate the impact of interest rate cuts and depreciation 
on the marginal efficiency of investment, which he implicitly assumed constant. The boom-and-
bust  cycles,  which  have  been  observed  since  the  1980s  in  emerging  markets  and  industrial 
countries show patterns of mal- or overinvestment, i.e. waves of (speculative) investments with 
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low marginal efficiency (Hoffmann and Schnabl 2008, Schnabl and Hoffmann 2009), which are 
threatened to be dismantled during crisis. In contrast to Mundell (1961) who assumes that the 
crisis  originates  in  a  random  shock,  the  real  and  monetary  overinvestment  theories  by 
Schumpeter (1911) and Hayek (1931) interpret crisis as the outcome of unsustainable investment 
activities and speculation during the boom.  
 
Hayek (1931) argues that distorted price signals on financial markets trigger investment above 
the  equilibrium  level  (which  is  regarded  to  be  determined  by  aggregate  saving).  During  the 
economic upswing the marginal efficiency of realized investment projects declines, as capital 
market  interest  rates  remain  below  the  long-term  equilibrium  level  (which  he  calls  natural 
interest rate, at which investment is equal to saving). When rising inflation urges the central bank 
to  lift  interest  rates,  past  and  future  investment  becomes  subject  to  a  new  benchmark. 
Unprofitable investment (with a marginal efficiency below the increased interest rates) has to be 
dismantled. Wages and prices fall, and the average marginal efficiency of investment rises. 
 
In Schumpeter’s (1911: 350) real overinvestment theory the recession is a process of uncertainty 
and disorder, which is understood as the search for a new equilibrium. Enterprises threatened by 
declining demand and prices either exit from the market, consolidate their business activities or 
struggle to survive on a lower level of production, for instance by changing products or the 
overall type of business activity. The recession is necessary to force a re-allocation of resources 
on the enterprise sector. The reorganisation of the production process leads – accompanied by 
painful individual losses and calamities – to the emergence of new products, the reduction of 
production costs and – due to declining prices – increasing real incomes. Price reductions and 
productivity  increases  during  the  downswing  are  seen  as  the  prerequisite  for  a  sustainable 
recovery. 
 
Schumpeter (1911: 360-369) regards the “cleansing effect” of recessions – despite the negative 
consequences in form of (temporarily) rising unemployment – as an essential part of a market 
economy for four reasons. First, speculative investment is to be abandoned. Second, inefficient 
enterprises  have  to  leave  the  market.  Third,  the  efficiency  of  the  remaining  enterprises  is 
strengthened,  as  wages  decline  and  productivity  rises.  Fourth,  new  enterprises,  products  and 
productions processes emerge at the cost of old ones. This implies that general interest rate cuts 
in  response  to  crisis  create  invisible  costs in  form  of  “the  persistence  of  the  unadpated  and 
unlivable” (Schumpeter 1911: 367). The exchange rate regime matters for the cleansing effect, 
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because maintaining the peg during the crisis is equivalent to imposing a restructuring process on 
the  enterprise  sector.  In  contrast,  discretionary  monetary  expansion  and  depreciation  would 
enable the enterprises to circumvent dire restructuring. Investment with low marginal efficiency 
is conserved and long-term growth perspectives decline. 
 
Whereas Schumpeter’s (1911) argument was focused on the private sector it can be extended to 
the public sector, as in the first generation of currency crisis models (Flood and Garber 1984): 
After unsustainable public debt has been financed via capital inflows and monetary expansion, 
the reversal of international capital flows forces a painful restructuring of public expenditure, as 
mostly  recently  in  Greece:  Exuberance  in  public  expenditure,  which  was  before  the  crisis 
nurtured by capital inflows, led to rising public, private wages and rising prices. The outcome 
was the real appreciation of the Greek “currency” as well as to an unsustainable current account 
deficit.
1 The reversal of capital flows forced upon Greece a dire restructuring process in both the 
public and private sector, which is supervised by the IMF and European institutions.
2 
 
If, nurtured by abundant global liquidity, overinvestment is the momentum behind boom-and-
crisis  cycles  in  single  countries  and  different  regions,  the  policy  recommendations  diverge 
depending on the theoretical framework. In the view of Hawtrey (1919), Mundell (1961) and 
Bernanke  (2010)  monetary  expansion  and  depreciation  are  sufficient  to  restore  the  pre-crisis 
growth performance. Keynes (1936) recommended fiscal expansion, after monetary expansion 
seemed  to  have  proved  ineffective.  In  the  view  of  Hayek  (1929)  interest  rate  cuts  and 
depreciation conserve low yield investment projects and postpone the crisis to a later point of 
time.  In  the  view  of  Schumpeter  (1911)  monetary  expansion  and  depreciation  prevents  the 
reallocation of resources, thereby constituting a drag on long-term growth.  
 
Thus, Hawtrey (1919), Keynes (1936) and Mundell (1961) provide policy recommendations to 
stabilize the economy in the short term (whereas the long-term consequences are outside the 
framework). Hayek (1937) and Schumpeter (1911) offer a long-term growth perspective, (but 
provide no “quick fix” for the economic calamities of crisis). The exchange rate regime can be 
                                                 
1    The integration of the Greek capital markets into the euro area did – in the contrast to Mundell (1961, 1973) – not 
help to absorb the 2010 asymmetric shock. Instead, the lower transaction costs for intra-European capital flows 
after the euro introduction contributed to the real divergence among the members of the common currency before 
the crisis and further aggravated the shock during the crisis. 
2    Schumpeter (1929: 356-358) stresses the role of the government in preventing recessions in fulfilling their tasks 
of cleansing the economy from uncompetitive enterprises. Tolerating trusts, providing public subsidies because 
of  extraordinary  circumstances  or  tariff  protection  are  identified  as  tools  to  circumvent  the  bankruptcy  of 
enterprises. 
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seen as catalyst for one or the other policy option during asymmetric negative shocks. Under 
flexible exchange rates, depreciation is the most likely policy outcome in times of crisis. Under 
fixed exchange rates or in a currency union exchange rate rigidity serves as a catalyst for long-
term adjustment via productivity increases, wage austerity, and price cuts.
3 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
Given the different time dimensions of economic theories and stabilization tools, the issue of 
crisis adjustment via exchange rate flexibility and/or wage/price flexibility is an empirical one. 
We  aim  to  address  the  question  about  the  optimum  exchange  rate  regime  by  isolating  the 
interaction of exchange rate flexibility and price flexibility with respect to their impact on growth 
dependent on business cycle synchronization. Whereas Mundell (1961) argued that exchange rate 
adjustment (i.e. price stability) during crisis increases the (short-term) growth performance, in the 
view of Schumpeter (1911) exchange rate stability during crisis enhances the need for price and 
wage flexibility, what can be seen as a prerequisite for dynamic long-term growth. The foregoing 
empirical analysis augments the previous empirical literature as listed in section 1 by analyzing 
the impact of exchange rate flexibility on growth contingent on business cycle synchronization. 
 
4.1 Sample, Volatility Measures and Business Cycle Correlation 
 
To  trace  the  impact  of  exchange  rate  flexibility/stability  on  growth,  we  choose  five  country 
groups  for  which  the  choice  of  the  appropriate  exchange  rate  regime  has  been  high  on  the 
political agenda: In the EU15 as well as in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (Emerging 
Europe), the discussion about membership in the European Monetary Union and/or the optimum 
degree of exchange rate stability against the euro continues to be high on the political agenda. 
The discussion about the pro and cons of EMU membership and exchange rate stability against 
the euro was revived during the most recent crisis.  
 
In East Asia and South America the optimum degree of exchange rate stability against the dollar 
continues to be discussed, in particular since the Asian crisis and drastic US interest rate cuts 
following the subprime crisis. Most recently, Japan, China and Brazil have been involved in a 
                                                 
3    Duchêne et al. (2004) and Fidrmuc and Maurel (2004) interpret the economic success of EU countries of fixed 
exchange rates during the nineties in the same vein. Purfield and Rosenberg (2010) provide empirical evidence 
for the restructuring process of the Baltic countries during the recent crisis. 
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discussion  on  “currency  wars”  and  competitive  interest  rate  cuts  (McKinnon  2010).  In  the 
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States,  Russia’s  move  towards  a  currency  basket  and  the 
depreciation of the CIS currencies during the recent crisis has revived the question about the 
optimum exchange rate policy. In this context, the choice of the anchor currency and therefore 
the degree of business cycle synchronization with the anchor country plays an important role.   
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The five country groups include all countries of the respective region excluding microstates – 
which may bias the sample towards a very high positive effect of exchange rate stability on 
growth (Rose 2004) – and countries with insufficient data such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Guyana etc. This brings us to a sample size of 45 countries. (See Table 1 for an overview.) Table 
1 also lists the prevailing anchor currencies and thereby the reference countries for measuring 
business cycle correlation. For the countries in East Asia, South America and the CIS the dollar 
has  been  the  prevailing  target  of  exchange  rate  stabilization.  Business  cycle  correlation  is 
measured versus the US.  
 
For the European countries before the introduction of the euro in 1999, the German mark has 
been the dominant anchor currency. Since then, the euro has become the natural anchor for the 
European non-EMU countries. Exchange rate stability is measured against the German mark 
before 1999 and against the euro after 1999. Once a one country has entered the EMU the proxy 
for exchange rate volatility is set to zero. Business cycle correlation in Europe is measured versus 
Germany, which is the largest European economy (and therefore a country with a high degree of 
business  cycle  correlation  with  the  euro  area).  For  Germany,  France  as  the  second  largest 
European economy is used as a reference country to measure business cycle correlation.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The data sources are the IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF World Economic Outlook, 
and the national central banks. For all macroeconomic data we use yearly frequencies. Yearly 
volatility measures for exchange rates and price flexibility are computed based on monthly data. 
The sample period starts in 1994, to avoid putting in the analysis the first years of the nineties, 
which  for  most  of  the  European  and  CIS  countries  reflect  specifics  linked  to  the  transition 
process.  
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We use de facto exchange rate volatility measures, because de jure volatility measures are likely 
to be flawed by fear of floating (Calvo and Reinhart (2002), McKinnon and Schnabl (2004a), De 
Grauwe  and  Schnabl  (2008)).  De  facto  exchange  rate  volatility  is  measured  by  the  standard 
deviation of monthly percent exchange rate changes (s) and the arithmetic average of percent 
exchange rate change (m). Both measures are summarized by the z-score (  ) as in 
Schnabl (2009). All three variables are calculated against the euro or the dollar, depending of the 
anchor currency as listed in Table 1. In the same way, price flexibility is proxied by the standard 
deviation of monthly changes of the producer price index of the respective year, by the average 
of monthly changes of producer price index of the respective year, and a combination of both (z-
score).  
 
Figure 1 shows the real growth rates of the 45 countries in the sample by country group. We 
observe different degrees of business cycle synchronization for different countries and different 
country groups. As we aim to analyze the impact of exchange rate stability on growth in the 
context  of  business  cycles  synchronization  we  construct  two  dummies  for  business  cycle 
synchronization. First to construct a dummy for business cycle correlation (Dbcc), we calculate 
average business cycle  correlation for every country  group.  If in one country business cycle 
correlation is higher than the country group average the dummy is set equal to one. The dummy 
is zero if the degree of business cycle correlation is below average.  
 
Second an alternative dummy (index) is constructed based on output gaps. For this purpose, 
output gaps for all countries in the sample including the country providing the anchor currency 
for exchange rate stabilization are computed. Then, the absolute value of the differences between 
the output gap  (the deviation of the growth rate from the period average) of every single country 
in our sample and the reference country as listed in Table 1 is compiled and multiplied by (-1).
4 
If the output gap of a  country in our sample and the output gap of the respective reference 
country are identical the optimum value of the index for business cycle correlation is zero. The 
more  the  output  gaps  between  anchor  and  periphery  country  diverge,  the  larger  will  be  the 
negative value of the index for business cycle correlation.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
                                                 
4   j i i outputgap outputgap index - - =  with i being the countries of our sample and j being the reference 
countries, Germany for the European countries, France for Germany, and the US for the rest of the world.  
2 2 s m + = z
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Based  on  the  theoretical  literature  we  would  expect  a  trade-off  between  exchange  rate 
flexibility/volatility and price flexibility. Countries with a high degree of exchange rate stability 
have to exhibit a higher degree of wage and price flexibility to adjust to asymmetric shocks. 
Countries, which allow for more exchange rate flexibility could allow for more wage rigidity. 
This is shown in Figure 2, which compares producer price flexibility for the corner solutions in 
the choice of exchange rate regime in the new member states of the European Union. Whereas 
Poland and the Czech Republic have opted for a high degree of exchange rate flexibility, Estonia 
and Latvia have chosen tight exchange rate pegs. Figure 1 clearly reveals the relative high degree 
of producer price flexibility in the Baltic countries compared to Poland and the Czech Republic, 
particularly in recessions. 
 
4.2. Model Specification and Estimation Procedure 
 
We  analyze  the  impact  of  exchange  rate  flexibility/volatility  and  price  flexibility  on  growth 
contingent on business cycle correlation. Equation (1) is the benchmark equation as found in the 
empirical growth literature (see for instance Chang, Kaltani and Loayza 2009). The explanatory 
variables are the indicators of exchange rate volatility, price flexibility and control variables. In 
addition to country fixed effects, time fixed effects for the years 1994 to 2009 are included.  
 
                                                                           (1)    
          
Where  wit  are  the  yearly  real  growth  rates  from  1994  to  2009.  ERvol  stands  for  the  three 
measures of exchange rate volatility as described above (standard deviations, mean of percent 
exchange  rate  changes  against  the  anchor  currency,  z-score).  Pflex  is  the  proxy  for  price 
flexibility measured in the same way as exchange rate volatility in terms of standard deviations 
of the producer price index, means of monthly percent changes and a combination of both. The 
vector Zit represents the control variables.  
 
We control for the short-term interest rates of the respective reference country as one of the most 
important determinant of global growth. Average inflation, proxied by the average of monthly 
year-over-year  changes  of  the  consumer  price  index  controls  for  (negative)  growth  effects 
originating in macroeconomic instability (which is linked to exchange rate volatility). We control 
for the fact that more asymmetric countries face bigger constraints to achieve the same growth by 
it it it it i it u Z Pflex ERvol w + G + + + = b a g
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using the index for the synchronization of output gaps (index). Furthermore, we control for a 
different impact of our explanatory variables in recession periods with the help of our recession 
dummy which is equal to one when the growth rate is negative. 
 
There is a large number of other potential explanatory variables like investment, government 
spending, which could increase the fit of the model, but also generate endogeneity (for instance 
investment and growth) and multicollinetarity bias (for instance between government spending 
and  inflation)    (De  Grauwe  and  Schnabl  2008).  Therefore,  we  opt  for  a  more  parsimonious 
specification, restricted to the control variables mentioned above.  
 
Our objective is twofold: to highlight the impact of exchange rate stability and price flexibility on 
growth and to disentangle the role played by countries with asymmetric business cycles (which 
we call asymmetric countries). Our prior is that the impact of exchange rate volatility and that of 
price  flexibility,  if  any,  should  be  restricted  to  asymmetric  countries.  In  a  second  step,  we 
introduce therefore the dummy for business cycle correlation, which is interacted with exchange 
rate  volatility  and  price  flexibility.  The  dummy  is  set  equal  to  one  for  countries  below  the 
average regional business cycle correlation.  
1 2 1 1 2 1 * * it i it it it it it it w ERvol ERvol Dbcc Pflex Pflex Dbcc Z u g a a b b = + + + + + G+      (2) 
In a third step, as a robustness check, we interact exchange rate volatility and price flexibility 
with the recession dummy to identify a possibly different impact in recessions. 
1 2 1 2 * * it i it it it it it it w ERvol ERvol Drec Pflex Pflex Drec Z u g a a b b = + + + + + G+     (3) 
Fixed effect models are estimated to address the omitted variables bias and the heterogeneity of 
the sample, which includes countries at different stages of economic development. There is a 
core concern about endogeneity, as the incentive for depreciating exchange rates increases in 
recessions and/or when asymmetric shocks happen. Endogeneity is also likely to affect the price 
flexibility variable, as fast growing countries are more prone to be flexible, having more room for 
price adjustment. To address those sources of endogeneity, GMM analysis will be used (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991) in addition to fixed effects OLS regressions. 
 
4.3. Estimation Results 
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The  estimation  results  for  the  period  from  1994  to  2009  provide  evidence  of  a  significant 
correlation between exchange rate volatility and growth as well as between price flexibility and 
growth. Higher exchange rate volatility has a strong negative impact on growth, while more price 
flexibility  contributes  to  a  higher  growth  performance.  Those  results  are  robust  and  hold 
whatever indicator for exchange rate volatility and price flexibility (standard deviation s, average 
yearly  change  m,  and  z-score)  is  used.  Their  effect  is  economically  important.  According  to 
column 2.1, a ten percent decrease in exchange rate volatility leads to a 0.87 increase in annual 
growth, while a ten percent increase in price flexibility allows a 0.12 increase in annual growth. 
Control variables coefficients are significant and have the expected signs. More average inflation 
deters growth, and lower interest rates in the reference country imply more opportunities for 
investment,  which  translates  into  higher  growth.  Growth  rates  are  lower  during  periods  of 
recession  and  when  asymmetric  shocks  prevail.  The  results  remain  qualitatively  the  same 
whatever the econometric procedure (fixed effects or GMM) is. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The findings turn out to be driven by asymmetric countries. Table 3 displays the estimates of 
equation  2  for  exchange  rate  volatility  and  price  flexibility  interacted  with  the  asymmetric 
countries dummy. As reflected in columns 3.1 to 3.6, the interaction terms capture most of the 
impact of exchange rate volatility and price flexibility on growth. The non-interacted coefficients 
of  exchange  rate  volatility  and  price  flexibility  are  no  more  significant,  while  the  interacted 
coefficients are significant, meaning that the effects of exchange volatility and price flexibility 
are  restricted  to  asymmetric  countries.  Those  findings  support  our  view  that  exchange  rate 
stability increases the growth performance and that countries with asymmetric business cycles 
have better to resort to internal adjustment to cope with recessions and/or asymmetric shocks. 
Internal adjustment tools like price and wage flexibility serve the objective of a dynamic long-
term growth performance while at the same time correcting cyclical imbalances. 
 
We run the same equation for the three indicators of exchange rate volatility (standard deviation 
s, yearly change m, and z-score) and three indicators of price flexibility (standard deviation s,  
yearly change m, and z-score). Except for the z-score indicators, our findings are robust and 
qualitatively the same.  
 
                                                          [Insert Table 3 here] 
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Table  4  reports  the  estimates  of  equation  3  for  exchange  rate  volatility  and  price  flexibility 
interacted with the recession dummy. This specification isolates the impact of exchange volatility 
and price flexibility on growth during the recessions. The table shows that countries tend to allow 
for more exchange rate flexibility during recessions, which translates into lower growth. The 
non-interacted exchange rate variable has no impact on growth. Price flexibility affects positively 
long-run growth as expected. However, this effect does not turn out to be more pronounced 
during recessions. In all cases, the non-interacted variable is significant at 1%, while in three out 
of six cases the combined interacted and non-interacted variables are significant at 5%. Overall 
those results suggest that like for asymmetric countries, countries experiencing crisis have better 
to adjust through internal prices rather than by resorting to exchange rates.  
 
                                                    [Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In the light of the most recent global wave of crisis the discussion about the role of the exchange 
rate  for  the  adjustment  of  asymmetric  shocks  has  been  revived.  In  general,  in  the  spirit  of 
Mundell  (1961)  exchange  rate  devaluation  in  the  face  of  crisis  is  widely  regarded  as  an 
appropriate tool to return to sustainable growth. However, the Keynesian adjustment strategies 
neglect the possibly negative impact of expansionary macroeconomic policies on the marginal 
efficiency of investment as stressed by Schumpeter (1911) and Hayek (1931).  
 
Based  on  the  discussion  of  the  seminal  theoretical  literature  on  exchange  rate  based  shock 
adjustment we find that the benefits of depreciation in recessions depend on the time horizon. 
From a short-term perspective devaluations seem beneficial as they help to jumpstart investment 
and exports without dire austerity. From a more long-term perspective exchange rate stability 
during crisis is beneficial as the crisis countries are forced to adjust by wage cuts, price cuts and 
productivity increases. A higher (average) marginal efficiency of investment contributes to robust 
long-term growth. 
 
Our  empirical  estimations  provide  evidence  in  favor  of  a  positive  impact  of  exchange  rate 
stability  and  price  flexibility  on  growth.  This  finding  is  robust  concerning  the  choice  of  the 
exchange rate volatility measure and the price flexibility measure. This finding is driven (in the 
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sense  of  Mundell  1961)  by  countries  with  asymmetric  business  cycles,  which  have  –  given 
exchange rate stability – to rely on productivity and wage adjustments to cope with shocks. The 
need for adjustment arises in specific in recession periods, whereas during booms exchange rate 
stability can be linked to rising wages and a loss of competitiveness. 
 
The economic policy conclusion is that during crisis and in particular during the recovery after 
crisis interest rates should not be kept too low for too long to avoid competitive depreciations. 
Otherwise, the necessary adjustment process after the exuberance during the boom would be 
postponed and distorted economic structures would be conserved. This would paralyze the long-
term growth performance of single countries, integrated regions and the whole world. For Europe 
we recommend continuing the monetary integration process, as – given our estimation results – 
the euro seems beneficial from both a microeconomic and macroeconomic perspective. 
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Figure 1: Growth Rates and Business Cycle Synchronization 
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Source: IMF. 
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Table 1: Sample by Country Groups, Exchange Rate Anchor and Reference Country for    
Business Cycle Correlation 
Country Group  Anchor 
Reference Country 
Countries 
EU15  Euro/DM  
Germany 
Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France, 
Germany*,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK 
Emerging Europe  Euro/DM 
Germany 
Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Rep., 
Slovenia,  Albania,  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Croatia, 
Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey 
East Asia  Dollar 
US 
China,  Hong  Kong,  Indonesia,  Japan,  Malaysia, 
Philippines,  Singapore,  South  Korea,  Taiwan, 
Thailand 
South America  Dollar 
US 
Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Columbia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
CIS  Dollar 
US 
Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Georgia, 
Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyz  Republic,  Moldova,  Russia, 
Ukraine 
* For Germany, France as the second largest country of the European Union is used as a 
reference country. 
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Figure 2: Producer Price Flexibility in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Source: IMF 
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Table 2: Estimation Results of Equation (1), 1994-2009 
  OLS 
2.1 
GMM 
2.2 
OLS 
2.3 
GMM 
2.4 
OLS 
2.5 
GMM 
2.6 
Exchange rate volatility             
Standard deviation s  -0.087*** 
(0.023) 
-0.102*** 
(0.017) 
       
Yearly Change m      -0.112*** 
(0.042) 
-0.080*** 
(0.031) 
   
z-score           -0.075*** 
(0.021) 
-0.078*** 
(0.013) 
Price flexibility             
Standard deviation s  0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.001) 
       
Yearly Change m      0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.000) 
   
z-score           0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.009*** 
(0.000) 
Lagged growth    0.150*** 
(0.014) 
  0.151*** 
(0.012) 
  0.126*** 
(0.013) 
Control variables             
Average inflation  -0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006*** 
(0.000) 
Interest rate of reference country  -0.121*** 
(0.011) 
-0.119*** 
(0.005) 
-0.117*** 
(0.011) 
-0.114*** 
(0.004) 
-0.120*** 
(0.011) 
-0.129*** 
(0.006) 
Index  0.476*** 
(0.047) 
0.608*** 
(0.032) 
0.487*** 
(0.047) 
0.536*** 
(0.024) 
0.475*** 
(0.047) 
0.573*** 
(0.034) 
Recession dummy  -0.051*** 
(0.002) 
-0.048*** 
(0.002) 
-0.051*** 
(0.002) 
-0.051*** 
(0.001) 
-0.051*** 
(0.002) 
-0.045*** 
(0.002) 
Fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Number of obs.   765  723  765  723  765  723 
R2 within  0.6712    0.6730    0.6735   
R2 overall  0.5372    0.5389    0.5419   
Wald    9975    26316    43843 
Data source:  IMF, national central banks. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results of Equation (2), 1994-2009 
  OLS 
3.1 
GMM 
3.2 
OLS 
3.3 
GMM 
3.4 
OLS 
3.5 
GMM 
3.6 
Exchange rate volatility             
Standard deviation s  0.00 
(0.028) 
0.044 
(0.028) 
       
Standard deviation s times dummy 
=1 for asymmetric countries 
-0.20*** 
(0.039) 
-
0.183*** 
(0.029) 
       
Yearly Change m      -0.027 
(0.048) 
-0.038* 
(0.022) 
   
Yearly Change m times dummy =1 
for asymmetric countries 
    -
0.290*** 
(0.088) 
-
0.337*** 
(0.053) 
   
z-score           -0.045* 
(0.026) 
-
0.061*** 
(0.020) 
z-score times dummy =1 for 
asymmetric countries 
        -0.072* 
(0.04) 
-
0.046*** 
(0.018) 
Price flexibility             
Standard deviation s  -0.026 
(0.028) 
-0.05 
(0.007) 
       
Standard deviation s times dummy 
=1 for asymmetric countries 
0.038 
(0.038) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
       
Yearly Change m      -0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
   
Yearly Change m times dummy =1 
for asymmetric countries 
    0.020** 
(0.009) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
   
z-score           -0.006 
(0.009) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
z-score times dummy =1 for 
asymmetric countries 
        0.011 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Lagged growth    0.155*** 
(0.014) 
  0.127*** 
(0.016) 
  0.130*** 
(0.016) 
Control variables             
Average inflation  -
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Interest rate of reference country  -
0.125*** 
(0.011) 
-
0.122*** 
(0.006) 
-
0.125*** 
0.011) 
-
0.125*** 
(0.007) 
-
0.122*** 
(0.011) 
-
0.121*** 
(0.006) 
Index  0.416*** 
(0.052) 
0.480*** 
(0.039) 
0.459*** 
(0.050) 
0.479*** 
(0.054) 
0.452*** 
(0.054) 
0.514*** 
(0.046) 
Recession dummy  -
0.049*** 
(0.002) 
-
0.047*** 
(0.002) 
-
0.050*** 
(0.002) 
-
0.051*** 
(0.002) 
-
0.050*** 
(0.002) 
-0051*** 
(0.002) 
Fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Number of obs.   765  723  765  723  765  723 
R2 within  0.6830    0.679    0.6753   
R2 overall  0.5527    0.543    0.5428   
Wald    42018    26316    6898 
Data source:  IMF, Central Banks. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: Estimates of the growth equation 1994-2009, with recession dummy 
  OLS 
4.1 
GMM 
4.2 
OLS 
4.3 
GMM 
4.4 
OLS 
4.5 
GMM 
4.6 
Exchange rate volatility             
Standard deviation s  0.044 
(0.069) 
0.041 
(0.062) 
       
Standard deviation s times dummy 
=1 for recession 
-0.117* 
(0.072) 
-0.134** 
(0.076) 
       
Yearly Change m      0.003 
(0.064) 
-0.106 
(0.073) 
   
Yearly Change m times dummy =1 
for recession 
    -0.173** 
(0.082) 
-0.024 
(0.087) 
   
z-score           0.005 
(0.053) 
-0.015 
(0.067) 
z-score times dummy =1 for 
recession 
        -0.074 
(0.057) 
-0.039 
(0.070) 
Price flexibility             
Standard deviation s  0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
       
Standard deviation s times dummy 
=1 for recession 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
       
Yearly Change m      0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
   
Yearly Change m times dummy =1 
for recession 
    -0.002 
(0.002) 
-
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
   
z-score           0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.000) 
z-score times dummy =1 for 
recession 
        -0.003 
(0.002) 
-
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
Lagged growth    0.148*** 
(0.012) 
  0.121*** 
(0.011) 
  0.136*** 
(0.008) 
Control variables             
Average inflation  -
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
Interest rate of reference country  -
0.123*** 
(0.011) 
-
0.119*** 
(0.006) 
-
0.121*** 
(0.011) 
-
0.123*** 
(0.005) 
-
0.122*** 
(0.011) 
-
0.124*** 
(0.004) 
Index  0.478*** 
(0.047) 
0.567*** 
(0.035) 
0.479*** 
(0.046) 
0.598*** 
(0.026) 
0.476*** 
(0.047) 
0.538*** 
(0.019) 
Recession dummy  -
0.048*** 
(0.002) 
-
0.045*** 
(0.002) 
-
0.049*** 
(0.002) 
-
0.046*** 
(0.002) 
-
0.049*** 
(0.002) 
-
0.046*** 
(0.001) 
Fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Number of obs.   765  723  765  723  765  723 
R2 within  0.6755    0.6774    0.6763   
R2 overall  0.5412    0.5447    0.5435   
Wald    4487    19963    20436 
Data source:  IMF, Central Banks. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. 
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